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Home > India In Transition > Politics
Challenges and Opportunities Facing India's Poorest State
By Jeffrey Witsoe | Print |
08.20.2007 | PDF |
As India registers impressive
growth rates and is increasingly seen as an emerging
economic superpower, Bihar serves as a vivid reminder
of the parts of India that are being left behind.
Bihar, a populous state of over 90 million, is India's
poorest state with one third the per capita income
of India as a whole and one fifth that of India's
most prosperous states. Bihar also has the lowest
literacy levels and the lowest human development index
ranking among Indian states.
In 2005 a National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) state government, with Nitish
Kumar as chief minister, came to power in an election
that the Indian national media characterized as a
groundbreaking referendum for development and good
governance. Since then the state government has initiated
an ambitious reforms agenda. The government's degree
of success in implementing this agenda have significant
implications for India as a whole, not least because
of the sheer population of Bihar and its similarities
with neighboring Uttar Pradesh (an even more populous
state of 166 million). The future of Bihar will in
no small part determine whether increasing inequality
between regions and social groups in India can be
reversed.
The Nitish Kumar government's development projects
are highly ambitious, especially when compared to
the performance of the previous government. The state
government's approach paper for the 11th five-year
plan aims to achieve "all inclusive growth at
an accelerated pace" and includes the incredibly
ambitious goal of "making Bihar a developed state
by 2015" with targets such as halving the poverty
ratio by 2015 (in line with the Millennium Development
Goals), connecting every village with more than 500
people with all-weather roads, and generating nearly
five million jobs. Administrative reforms have been
initiated along with police reforms and fast track
courts and corporations have submitted billions of
dollars worth of investment proposals. A large number
of these are for sugar processing plants, especially
for ethanol production, that will significantly increase
agricultural incomes within a fifty kilometer radius
of the plants (sugarcane being a high value crop that
requires processing within hours of being harvested).
In order to understand the socio-political context within which these projects are being initiated, it is important to recognize the profound social change that occurred in Bihar over the last two decades. Lalu Yadav, and later his wife Rabri Devi, who served as chief ministers of Bihar from 1990 to 2005, focused on the political empowerment of lower castes instead of development related issues. In the space of just a decade, from 1985 to 1995, the number of backward caste candidates elected to the assembly more than doubled to 50%, while the number of upper caste candidates more than halved to 17%, indicating a profound transformation of political representation in the state. During this period upper caste landlords experienced a general decline in their fortunes while peasant cultivator castes, especially Yadavs, Kurmis, and Koeris, gradually acquired a stronger role within the rural economy. This has been accompanied by a general breakdown in patron-client relations within the agrarian economy, contributing to labor mobility. For example, the number of bonded laborers in a resurvey of twelve villages in north Bihar conducted by the Institute for Human Development found that the percentage of laborers that were bonded decreased from 30% to 10% from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, and in many other villages, bonded labor has disappeared altogether.
Within this context, the poor faired better than we
might expect considering the Bihar government's development
record. From 1993-94 to 2004-05 the poverty ratio
declined 14% (from 57.24% to 43.06%), compared to
an 8% decline in India as a whole and a less than
2.5% decline in Orissa (which has now surpassed Bihar
as the state with the highest headcount ratio of 47.76%).
Even more surprising, the headcount ratio of the very
poor halved in Bihar from 28.29% to 14.65% compared
to a 5.74% decrease in India and an actual increase
in Orissa (from S. Mahendra Dev and C. Ravi, 2007.
These figures are from the 61st round of the NSS and
are for united Bihar). While this improvement was
from a very low base, it is still surprising given
the dismal condition of public institutions and the
lack of investment in the state during this period.
A combination of higher wages for agricultural laborers
and remittances from an increasing number of migrants,
many of whom experienced increased labor mobility
as traditional patron-client relations and bonded-labor
ties broke down, explains this surprising decline
in poverty.
There is, in fact, a fundamental tension between lower
caste empowerment and state directed development.
The key levels of the bureaucracy and the police have
long been controlled by people from upper caste backgrounds
in Bihar and this control served to reinforce the
domination of upper caste landlords in the countryside.
In 2002, for example, out of a total of 244 Bihar
cadre officers of the elite Indian Admistrative Service,
135 were from upper caste groups, while only seven
officers came from the three largest backward caste
groups (based on my approximate data). The political
assertion of lower castes from the early 1990s resulted
in a deep-seated conflict between a new lower caste
political leadership and a largely upper caste bureaucracy,
police, and judiciary. This is why the politics of
caste empowerment resulted in a general breakdown
of public institutions in Bihar. Since upper caste
control of these institutions had reinforced structural
inequalities, however, this also explains why the
poor did better than we might expect despite the RJDs
government's dismal development record.
There is a danger, then, that the Bihar government's
aggressive development projects could actually exacerbate
inequalities if their capture by elites serves to
once again strengthen the hand of dominant landowning
castes. Popular slogans alleging that the current
government's "good governance" (susasan)
is actually upper caste "Bhumihar governance"
(bhusasan) reflects this fear. In addition, proposed
investments in Bihar are being stalled by land acquisition
problems, an increasingly common problem in many areas
of India but one which may pose particular problems
in Bihar because of the state's politicized rural
population. Initiation of all the proposed sugar processing
plants, with one exception (being set up by a company
owned by Bollywood director Prakash Jha who directly
negotiated with village landowners) has been stalled
by the government's inability to acquire land. Of
even greater concern is the law and order situation,
with a reported 4,849 kidnappings in the past year
according to reports submitted by district judges
(although it is unclear how many of these were for
ransom), despite serious measures taken by the state
government to tackle this problem. In the end, a modernized
and reformed police force will have to be combined
with governance that is responsive to the needs of
all section of society in order for the law and order
situation is to be rectified.
Of course the ideal scenario would combine the agenda
of social justice and inclusion with development and
growth and this is the promise that Nitish Kumar,
a veteran politician from the backward Kurmi caste,
represents to his lower caste supporters; not the
displacement of caste politics in favor of development,
as the national media often implies, but the combination
of caste empowerment and development. Nitish himself
has so far delivered with 20% reservations for the
extremely backward castes and 50% reservations for
women in local bodies and with his weekly janta darbar
that allow people to voice complaints directly to
the chief minister. It is unclear, however, how much
of a priority social inclusion is for the rest of
his government, especially at lower levels of governance.
While Bihar's political environment is extremely challenging,
it is perhaps most important to recognize the immense
economic challenges facing the state. Bihar is overwhelmingly
rural (90%) and heavily dependant on agriculture,
a sector that has not performed well in India over
the last two decades. So even under the best of circumstances
it is hard to imagine Bihar rapidly catching up with
India's most prosperous states. In fact, preventing
Bihar's position from sliding further in relation
to more developed states would be a considerable accomplishment.
There is a danger that expectations are being set
too high. Expectation management will be essential
in order to maintain political support for the government's
reform agenda. It is also clear that greatly increased
financial assistance from the center (and from multilateral
development agencies) will have to be extended if
Bihar is to meet its development goals.
Nitish Kumar is engaged in a very difficult balancing
act of attempting to satisfy the demands of his lower
caste supporters for empowerment, on which his government's
continued political viability depends, while taking
bold measures to jumpstart Bihar's stagnant economy.
The extent to which he is able to deliver will have
important implications for whether the slogan of "inclusive
growth" can be actualized in India. While significant
changes are occurring in Bihar, we should be careful
to recognize the challenges that remain.
Jeffrey Witsoe is Senior Research Coordinator at the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.
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