Does Clientelism Work: *A Test of Guessability in India*

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Abstract

Local brokers are thought to possess fine-grained information on voters' political preferences, material needs, and even social preferences. Research on clientelism assumes that party brokers or local leaders meet the most basic informational requirement of knowing voters' partisan preferences if not their votes. This assumption drives theoretical predictions on which voters politicians target with benefits, whether or not a quid pro quo exchange of benefits for votes is an efficient electoral strategy relative to programmatic distribution, and how we should expect brokers to behave more broadly. Nonetheless, this scholarship does not test this assumption and analysis of variation in brokers' ability to identify voters' partisan preferences has not been conducted. To test this assumption, this paper develops a behavioral measure, *guessability* based on whether or not village council presidents in Rajasthan, India can correctly guess the partisan preferences of voters survey in their local areas. I find *guessability* to be lower than existing research expects. Local leaders can identify the partisan preferences of voters who are easiest to guess due to their demographic characteristics or location in co-partisan networks, but are poor at identifying those whose partisan preferences are less obvious or less stable. This has important implications for how we understand targeted distribution in rural India.

1.   Introduction

Distributive politics under clientelism refers to a contingent exchange of benefits for votes in which the political characteristics of voters or small groups affect access to government benefits, favors that depend on political contacts, and other benefits candidates or parties distribute to voters during election campaigns (Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011). This is in contrast to programmatic distribution of individualized benefits that target beneficiaries according to codified eligibility criteria executed by a professionalized bureaucracy (Zucco 2013; De La O. 2013; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). For clientelism to be an efficient electoral strategy, parties employ a large number of party brokers—immersed in voters' local social networks—to collect extensive, often private information on voters' preferences and distribute cash and targeted government benefits in a way that increases the vote share of their principal. To execute this task, they must be able to identify core and marginal supporters, swing voters, and opposition voters; and, know what types of benefits will induce

particular passive supporters to turn out to vote and swing voters to vote for their candidate. Some scholars also expect party brokers to have the capacity to circumvent the secret ballot to identify how individuals or small groups have voted in order to punish voters who violated the benefits-for-votes quid-pro-quo by voting for another political party (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005; See also Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011).

The assumption or strong expectation that brokers can collect fine-grained information on the political preferences of voters from their neighborhoods is at the core of theories in the clientelism literature. This capacity to collect accurate information on voters' political preferences and votes is critical to explanations of who brokers target with state anti-poverty benefits and handouts during election campaigns (Stokes 2005; Calvo and Murillo 2013); the persistence of clientelism where the ballot is secret; and whether or not we should expect vote buying to be an effective electoral strategy. This is plausible in rural areas where local leaders have personally known voters in their neighborhoods for their entire lives and families tend to have resided in the same village for generations. It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted in Rajasthan and other Indian states in which local politicians reported that they can identify the political preferences and material needs of voters in their local areas.[2] Similarly, in Argentina, 80% of respondents interviewed in a 2009 broker survey fielded by Stokes and her co-authors said they could find out how someone in their neighborhood voted; Finan and Schechter (2012) found this to be the case in Paraguay as well.[3]

Despite assumptions in formal research and brokers' beliefs about their capacity to identify voters' partisan preferences, we do not know if this assumption holds in general and have reason to believe it does not in India. The independent Indian Elections Commission has become a model in its robust protection of the secret ballot. The belief in the secret ballot resonates with the Indian electorate. According to the 2009 National Election Study (NES) survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), only 13 percent of respondents believe that local politicians can usually find out how people vote at the polls. Moreover, India's pattern of anti-incumbency, which resulted in party turnover in every state election in Rajasthan since 1993, suggests that the tools incumbents' have at their disposal to monitor and credibly punish voters based on how they vote are limited. I argue in this paper that local politicians' inability to monitor—or convince voters that they can monitor-- vote choice carries over to the simpler task of identifying voters' partisan preferences. I find that village council

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[2] I conducted interviews informally in the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Rajasthan in 2011 that revealed this.
[3] Finan and Schechter (2012) found that brokers could guess the party voters voted for in the last election 80% of the time using a similar instrument to the one discussed here.

presidents, who often serve as brokers to higher-level politicians, incorrectly guess the partisan preferences of voters from their local areas 35.5% of the time and are matched or out-performed by low-information, low-cost alternatives that do not require brokers.[4] More specifically, I find that brokers are better at guessing the partisan preferences of voters who are either very easy to guess as a result of demographic characteristics or who are likely to reveal their partisan preferences as members of a local politician's co-partisan networks. Together, this suggests that local brokers cannot or do not perform the basic information gathering role existing scholarship assumes. If guessability is low, we should doubt parties' capacities to carry out a clientelistic strategy at the voter level, or more consequentially, whether or not selective benefits are allocated through a quid pro quo benefits-for-votes electoral strategy in the first place.

This paper provides one of the first tests of the presumption of high or complete partisan identifiability, which I refer to as *guessability*, and models variation in guessability across voter and elite characteristics. Guessability is a measure of whether or not a local broker correctly identifies the political preferences of a voter from his village council area. In the elite survey, village council presidents (sarpanch) were asked to guess the party a voter supported in the last state elections and the party he would support if an election were held tomorrow. Elites' guesses were compared to voters' actual partisan preferences measured in the voter survey.

This analysis offers several contributions to our understanding of the distribution of selective benefits. First, political science research in this area focuses more on strategies inferred from targeting outcomes than on the basic capacity of party machines to execute functions essential to efficient targeting under clientelism. Important theoretical advances such as Stokes et al.'s (2013) model of divergent preferences between party leaders and brokers and Diaz-Cayeros et al.'s (2007) mixed portfolio model push us to consider targeting outcomes when principal-agent problems between party leaders, brokers, and voters are severe. Nonetheless, we do not know whether brokers have the capacity to perform their primary role as collectors of information on voters' preferences and votes. The answer to this question has important practical and theoretical implications. If guessability is low, rather than waste resources on voters whose preferences and votes are difficult to monitor, party leaders may abandon vote buying as a targeted persuasive strategy and allocate benefits to activists instead (See

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[4] This is based on the vote intention measure. Note that GP ward members-- who are the more immediate neighbors of sampled voters-- have similar rates as sarpanch. Ward members incorrectly guessed voters' partisan preferences (based on the vote intention measure) 33.6% of the time. I use GP Presidents exclusively because they are a closer proxy to political brokers.

Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2007; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Kramon 2012). They may also distribute benefits conditional on electoral outcomes at the polling station level or above where information on aggregate vote shares is available without reliance on broker guessability. On the other hand, if political brokers are not assessed for their ability to identify voters' political preferences and votes because they are valued primarily as mobilizers of their own political networks, our theories should reflect this (Bjorkman 2013).

Second, we have little systematic data on the technology of clientelism at the local level. Many of our insights on the mobilization and information gathering roles party agents perform come from ethnographic studies that are necessarily small-n (Auyero 2001; Robinson 1988; Chandra 2004; Bjorkman 2013); cross-national elite surveys in which academics and journalists are asked to characterize parties' electoral and distributive strategies at a high level of generality (Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011); or voter surveys and survey experiments that collect data on access to state benefits or exposure to vote buying (Brusco et la. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2013; Corstange 2010). While these studies have advanced our understanding of the logic and practice of clientelism, research has not systematically assessed the information gathering capacities of local leaders essential to its functioning. This paper takes a first step in addressing this empirical gap. Third, this paper focuses on the information brokers have on voters' partisan preferences between elections. This is an important departure from existing work that focuses on vote buying during election campaigns. While vote buying provides a clear measure of how parties allocate their own funds free of the formal and informal constraints that shape policy implementation, evidence from studies of vote buying where party machines are less developed suggest that vote buying may be less politically targeted than expected (Kramon 2011). We should also expect voters to weigh access to state benefits and services more than low-value campaign handouts (See Lawson and Greene 2012). Moreover, if voters under clientelism must routinely navigate how to access state benefits and services, and politicians have incentive to leverage their discretion over allocation of these benefits for votes, local politicians should have incentive to perform on guessability during more quotidian times.

This study is based on data from Rajasthan, a North Indian state with features that are plausibly consistent with a high level of guessability: ethnicity is historically a powerful and stable predictor of partisan preferences; electoral volatility is below average among India's most populous states (Heath 2005); and the state is predominantly rural with low population density and an ethnically segregated rural social geography. The restriction of the voter sample to heads of household—who are typically the

most visible and politically engaged members of rural Indian households—bolsters this plausible expectation of high guessability. Adding an important complication, Rajasthan has a robust secret ballot defended by a professionalized electoral commission, intense inter-party competition, inter-party competition for the votes of the poor, and has experienced alternation between two major parties in every state election since 1993 (Yadav 2004; Thachil 2011; Lodh 2009; Krishna 2011). This allows us to consider the implications of variation on guessability in the growing universe of cases where competition and clientelism coincide (See Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2002; Corstange 2010; Vincente 2010).[5] If clientelism continues as a strategy in such cases, we should expect local politicians to be able to correctly identify the partisan preferences of voters whose families have been their neighbors for generations and who they overwhelmingly (95%) report to know personally.

2.   Terms

I define *clientelism* as a politician-voter linkage based on the conditional exchange of benefits for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). *Guessability* refers to the ability a political middleman has to guess the partisan preferences of voters in his locality correctly as a function of voter characteristics and elite characteristics. This can be understood as an operationalization of Kitschelt and Wilkinson's (2007) concept of vote predictability. Guessability may be a product of common knowledge such as group-party ties or family political reputations or due to more effort-intensive broker-voter interactions such as vote monitoring. I define monitoring as *effort* taken up by a political middleman to seek out private information on the political behaviors of voters. Monitoring should be distinguished from effortless guesses based on common knowledge. I define *selective* or *targeted benefits* as benefits that can be distributed at the level of households or individuals. Selective benefits differ from public goods that can be consumed by citizens regardless of their individual characteristics, whether this applies to an entire state (e.g. security), an entire village (e.g. main roads), or a number of villages (e.g. schools).

I define *brokers* as local politicians who are deeply embedded in their local communities and are serve as middlemen to higher-level politicians. Brokers are perceived to possess information on the material demands, votes, partisan preferences, and the elasticity of partisan preferences of voters from their locales. Higher-level politicians purportedly find brokers essential to winning elections because

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[5] Scholars have found evidence of dueling party machines in competitive systems in countries such as India (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Breeding 2007), Ghana (Lindberg 2008), Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2012), and Lebanon (Corstange 2010). Wilkinson (2007) similarly shows that a rising anti-Congress opposition in the 1960s in India led to a ratcheting up of clientelism.

they can leverage their knowledge of voters' partisan leanings and specific material demands to target swing voters or passive voters with the minimum payoff necessary to induce vote switching or turnout. They also use their central location in local social networks and routine interaction with voters to ensure they follow through with their end of the benefits-for-votes quid pro quo (See Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013).

The characterization of the broker, rooted in research in Latin America and America's urban machines, takes different forms where parties are poorly organized at the grassroots as is the case in India. First, the Indian and Latin American literature differ on the extent to which middlemen are formally party agents. Szwarcberg (2012) operationalized brokers in Argentina as elected city councilmen formally affiliated with a political party. She writes: "Councilmen's social proximity to voters enables them to learn about individual voter political preferences and propensity to turn out to vote, as much as to monitor their political behavior." For an Indian example, Manor (2000) refers to opportunistic informal local leaders or 'fixers' whose party loyalties are opportunistic and volatile from one election to the next. I am agnostic as to whether a broker's allegiance is temporary and won by the highest partisan bidder or a committed partisan agent (See Camp 2012).[6] In either case, I understand the objective of brokers to be to deliver votes to their principal.

Second, there is a debate over whether voters access benefits through fixers, independent of political and state institutions, or elected local politicians. The distinction is between 'freelance' political fixers, who serve as middlemen between benefit-seeking rural voters and politicians and bureaucrats at higher levels, and elected local politicians. In his study of fixers in South India, Manor (2000) argues that weak party organization in rural areas makes fixers essential to governance and instrumental to politicians (See also Krishna 2003). Manor argues that 'freelance' middlemen trade their knowledge of local political and economic conditions between elections and influence over voters during elections to whichever politician makes the best offer. On the other hand, Bussell (2011) and Kruks-Wisner (2012) find elected village council presidents to be the most frequent point of contact for voters seeking access to the state. Inbanathan and Gopalappa (2002) and my own anecdotal observations suggest that there is considerable overlap between elective office at the local level and prominent fixers, whom often contest elections for village council president. The distinction between brokers and elected local politicians is

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[6] In my survey data, I find substantial stability in the partisan preferences of sarpanch across state elections. Moreover, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) find that 90% of voters in their Rajasthan survey correctly identify the party of the sarpanch. This occurs despite the fact that party symbols are not allowed on the ballot in village council elections in Rajasthan and most other Indian states (See Pakel 2008).

that the former uses information and connections-- which higher-level politicians lack-- to obtain a price from the latter. Since, fixers' payoffs are a function of their bargaining position vis a vis higher-level politicians, they are incentivized to perform on guessability. On the other hand, local politicians are concerned with re-election and their *own* political careers. I argue that that this is a false distinction. While all local elected politicians are not brokers to state politicians, many use their influence and leverage over policy implementation to advance their political careers and use election results to signal the size of their network of support to party leaders. If the information and connections fixers possess matter because this affects voter mobilization, which party leaders use as a basis of assessment for advancement, ambitious brokers and sarpanch have similar objectives. The latter may simply have a sufficiently large network of support to win local elections.

I identify brokers through the mechanism of the direct elections of gram panchayat (village council) presidents in Rajasthan. GP Presidents oversee implementation of many government schemes funded by federal and state governments and, research suggests, apply discretion in doing so (See Besley et al. 2007; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Markussen 2010). There is also evidence that the first point of contact for benefit-seeking voters is the GP President, who has access to higher-level contacts that are important where the state is unresponsive (Kruks-Wisner 2010; Bussell 2011; Chhibber 2009). Moreover, evidence suggests that sarpanch in India are active in campaigns and serve as local mobilizers for state politicians. In my survey, 92% of sarpanch reported that they campaigned for a state politician in the last 5 years (since the last MLA elections in 2008), 80% said they attended a party rally for a party or candidate, and 85% attended a party meeting. This supports my presumption that while many local brokers have not been elected to the gram panchayat, GP presidents-- or their husbands or close family members-- are likely to perform functions akin to brokers. Identifying brokers formally through the result of elections has the strength of objectively yielding an identifiable local leader for a large number of GPs. This is the most reasonable, reliable, and feasible option for a large-scale measure of guessability—even if some party activists or unelected local leaders may better fit the broker description in some places.

3.   Guessability and Theories of Clientelism

The assumption or expectation of a high level of guessability is pervasive in the literature on vote buying and the distribution of targeted state benefits. The expectation is that since brokers are central figures in voters' social networks, they should be able to directly or indirectly observe voters' partisan preferences and votes; know which material benefits or favors voters want and what it costs to change

their vote or induce turnout; and, according to Finan and Schechter, identify information on social preferences as well. In this section, I discuss the central role that the guessability assumption plays in theories on both sides of the debate over whether parties can monitor voting behavior or must induce reciprocity self-enforced by voters in lieu of this capacity.

An important debate in the clientelism literature concerns party strategies in a context where votes can or cannot be monitored by party agents. Proponents of Stokes' (2005) perverse accountability framework argue that brokers' central location in voters' social networks, real or perceived loopholes to the secret ballot, and routine and continuing interactions between brokers and voters make it possible to detect how people in their localities vote despite the secret ballot (See also: Brusco et al. 2004; Medina and Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 2004).[7] Following from this, brokers can punish those who vote the wrong way and parties can solve the voter side of the commitment problem that underlies clientelism's quid pro quo exchange of benefits for votes. Stokes' explicitly assumes that brokers embedded in voters' communities—with whom voters expect to interact for the foreseeable future-- can identify voters' partisan preferences through their information gathering skill, central position in social networks, and power relative to voters. Stokes et al. (2013) use data from a survey of brokers in Venezuela and Argentina to support this claim: 80% said they could identify who were the swing voters, partisans, and which parties voters supported. Anecdotal evidence in Argentina by voters supported this claim, as does evidence in Paraguay presented by Finan and Schechter (2012) who found that local brokers could correctly guess partisan preferences 80% of the time on average. Scholars of distributive politics hold some form of the monitoring assumptions for individuals or small groups in numerous countries such as India (Chandra 2004), Argentina and Venezuela (Stokes et al. 2013), Mexico (Medina and Stokes 2007), and Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman 2003).

The guessability assumption is consequential to Stokes' predictions. First, the party strategy to target swing voters follow from this assumption. Stokes' model predicts that party leaders will pursue a strategy of targeting swing voters because brokers can monitor the votes of all partisan types. If guessability is low, particularly for the least predictable voters, the swing targeting prediction no longer holds. Second, the guessability assumption is central to the implication that if parties want to make targeted distribution more efficient, through increasing monitoring capacity, they should invest in

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[7] See: Kanchan Chandra (2004): 'Elections as Auctions', Seminar 539 <http://www.india seminar.com/2004/539/539%20kanchan%20chandra.htm > (accessed 10 October 2013).

increasing the number of per capita brokers where poor voters-- responsive to low-cost material inducements-- are numerous. If guessability is low, this implication does not hold because brokers lack the capacity to identify the partisan preferences or votes of a substantial share of voters with uncertain vote intentions.

Scholars of clientelism where ethnicity is politically salient suggest that taking group identities and group-party linkages into account reduces the difficulty of identifying voters' partisan preferences. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue that voters may pressure co-ethnics or members of the same geographic unit to vote as a bloc because parties can punish the group or geographic area as a whole.[8] Along similar lines, Chandra (2004) argues that co-ethnics coordinate their votes as a bloc in order to bargain with politicians for selective benefits and access to state services. Specifically, voters use politicians' ethnic identities and the ethnicities of those who benefit from distribution under a particular party or politician to coordinate their votes along ethnic lines while politicians mobilize voters along the same lines. Given the centrality of ethnic coordination, we should expect brokers to have highly localized information on group-party linkages. If partisan preferences can be predicted reasonably well by ethnic identity at the local level and above-- even among pivotal groups that change the party they support across elections but coordinate as a group—we should expect guessability to be high (See Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chhibber and Petrocik 1989). That said, ethnic information short-cuts only improve guessability to the extent that groups' partisan preferences are homogeneous, which recent work increasingly suggests is not the case. For example, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) find substantial heterogeneity in partisan preferences among members of the same castes who reside in the same villages or village council areas; while, evidence at the state-level shows within-group party preferences to be heterogeneous as well (See Thachil 2011; Chhibber et al. 2013; Huber and Suryanarayan 2013). This suggests that information on voters' ethnicities is not sufficient to remove the importance of the guessability assumption on theories of clientelism that depend on brokers' capacity to enforce the quid pro quo.

Another view rejects the vote monitoring assumption, but argues that local brokers use the extensive information they have on voters' political preferences and other more subtle characteristics to ensure voter compliance in the benefits-for-votes quid pro quo. These scholars argue that clientelism's commitment problem is addressed through reciprocity, which is self-enforced by voters rather than

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[8] Kitschelt, Herbet and Steven Wilkinson: p17.

coercively enforced by party agents (Finan and Schechter 2012; Vincente and Wantchekon 2009; See also Greene and Lawson 2012). Finan and Schechter (2012) argue that brokers in Paraguay address the problem of voter shirking by knowing voters in their villages so well that they can identify their partisan preferences, demographic characteristics, and social preferences such as intrinsic reciprocity and trust.[9] They argue that brokers can obtain subtle information about voters irrespective of social ties or voters' partisan preferences. In short, contrary to my results for Rajasthan, Finan and Schechter suggest that brokers are exceptionally good at collecting information on voters' private preferences. Finally, Calvo and Murillo (2013) also reject the monitoring assumption but differ from Finan and Schechter (2012) in that they argue brokers use partisan networks to collect information on voters' preferences before they allocate benefits. Here, voters reveal their partisan preferences and demonstrate their loyalty—such as through attendance at rallies-- to gain access to partisan patronage networks. This allows brokers to determine voters' partisan preferences before they provide benefits, and moves the demand on brokers to identify voters' private preferences to voters who must communicate those preferences convincingly to brokers. This logic is consistent with my results for Rajasthan as well.

3.2   Mechanisms of Guessability: Variation at the Micro-Level:

The central question for guessability posed by this research concerns whether performance on guessability is a function of a broker's ability to identify voters' political preferences—despite the secret ballot—or rooted in guesses based on common knowledge and voter-revealed preferences. If variation in guessability can be explained by a low-information logic, local politicians should be more likely to identify the partisan preferences of voters from ethnic and socio-economic groups that are most identified a particular party or from co-partisans in their political networks. If brokers' performance on guessability is a function of their skill at procuring information on voters' preferences as Stokes (2005) and Finan and Schechter (2012) posit, we should expect brokers to be able identify the partisan preferences of voters from all partisan types, particularly when measures of skill or capacity to execute this task are high. In this section, I consider variation in guessability with respect to three mechanisms that fit these two different views.

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[9] Middlemen correctly identified voters' political preferences toward the two main parties approximately 80% of the time and whether or not they voted in the prior election 71% of the time. They correctly guessed whether or not a voter considered themselves trustworthy and how they played dictator games 74% and 66% of the time respectively.

Default Observability Mechanism: Guessability by Common Knowledge

When brokers lack information on voters' private partisan preferences, variation in guessability should be explained by the availability of cues based on the priors brokers have about group-party linkages and partisan cues that are observable from voters' participation in public political activities. I expect that this is common knowledge in rural India. By the *default observability mechanism*, local brokers use priors on the distribution of partisan preferences across ethnic and class groups and observations of voters' public political activities to identify voters' partisan preferences, which are common knowledge in a local setting. At the level of groups, ethnicity and class often are the best predictors of partisanship where identity markers are visible and politically salient. This is often found to be the case in democracies characterized by the distribution of patronage in which groups compete for access to the policy benefits during the implementation process (Fearon 1999; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). Information shortcuts from ethnicity, however, provide clearer signals of partisanship for some ethnic groups than others. We should expect guessability to be higher when co-ethnics have more homogenous partisan preferences and lower when partisan preferences among group members are more heterogeneous (See Heath 2005; Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009; Huber and Suryanaram 2012). Similarly, where socio-economic status maps onto partisanship, we should expect stereotypes about class-party linkages to explain variation in guessability.

At the voter level, existing scholarship considers brokers to be keen observers of voters' actions and demands. In a local setting where public behavior is likely to be observed, we should expect brokers to observe voters' participation in public political activities-- if brokers themselves do not demand that voters participate in partisan activities such as rallies (Stokes et al. 2013; Auyero 2001; Szwarczberg 2011). The availability of partisan cues from political participation vary across voters. Passive voters are unlikely to interact with local brokers and participate in public political activities, and swing voters may conceal their vote intentions in order to drive up the price of their votes in accord with swing voter theory (See Nichter 2011). In short, we should expect guessability to be higher for voters who send clear public signals of partisanship through their political participation and affiliations.

Co-Partisan Networks and Guessability

A second mechanism rooted in a low information explanation for guessability is that brokers should be able to identify the partisan preferences of voters in their local co-partisan networks who

reveal their preferences to brokers at the outset. Ethnographic work suggests that brokers deliver electoral support to their patrons through developing and leveraging close personal ties to those in their local political and social networks (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012). Along these lines, Calvo and Murillo (2013) argue that brokers mediate access to selective benefits through integration into partisan networks, which allow them to collect extensive information on voters' preferences and behaviors. Brokers, then, use this information to distinguish between reliable and unreliable voters. Along these lines, Szwarcberg (2012) finds evidence in Argentina that voters must demonstrate their partisan and broker allegiances by attending political rallies in order to access selective benefits (See also Auyero 2001). Thus, if we take ballot secrecy and the difficulty of identifying partisan preferences seriously, parties have incentive to require voters, who seek access to selective benefits, to repeatedly reveal their political preferences through their involvement in partisan networks. If this mechanism explains variation in guessability, brokers should be better at guessing the political preferences of co-partisans than non-co-partisans-- and for this to occur with minimal effort on the part of brokers.

Perverse Accountability: Broker Skill and Guessability

The *perverse accountability mechanism* captures the conventional wisdom on brokers' skills at collecting information on voters' partisan preferences and identifying how they vote. Where a secret ballot is in place, brokers use their central location in local social networks, personal relationships, and visible clues to identify voters' preferences. Similarly, brokers use these tactics to identify partisan preferences, which shapes who will receive targeted benefits when no election is imminent as well as who should be targeted with handouts during election campaigns. Brokers are the key players in the quid pro quo story because they have the skill to identify partisan preferences for the full range of voter types in their local communities. The skill of brokers at identifying partisan preferences and other characteristics is also central to theories that do not accept the monitoring assumption. As noted, Finan and Schechter (2012) argue that brokers circumvent the problem of the commitment problem under the secret ballot by collecting more subtle information on voters' preferences. I argue that if brokers are capable of identifying voters' partisan preferences as a minimal measure of their information gathering skill, we should expect variation in guessability to be explained by variation in broker quality.

I understand broker quality as a latent variable that captures a local broker's skillset to perform the functions the clientelism literature suggests brokers are expected to perform: information collection

on voters' political preferences, voter mobilization, and the political targeting of selective benefits. I consider the components of that skillset to include: basic capacity (captured through education); knowledge of how to use the levers of power in the village council (through direct or indirect experience); and connections to higher-level politicians. Competent, experienced, and well-connected brokers should be better able to identify the political preferences of a wider range of voters, while lower quality brokers may only be able to guess the partisan preferences of voters from groups closely aligned with particular parties (through the default observability mechanism) or voters have revealed their preferences through co-partisan networks.[10]

4.   Background: the Case of India

Following from the literature on clientelism, the universe of cases where democratic politics is characterized as patronage-based vary in characteristics that are likely to impact guessability: level of electoral competition, urbanization, ballot secrecy, ethnic heterogeneity, and party organization at the local level. This study applies to contexts where the ballot is secret, democracy is consolidated, and electoral politics is sufficiently competitive that election outcomes are uncertain. Under these constraints, theory and politicians themselves suggests that guessability should be high in rural areas. In this section, I argue that India, and Rajasthan in particular, is a compelling case for the study of guessability and provide background on the paper's institutional setting: the village council or gram panchayat.

4.1.   Features of the Indian Context

Rajasthan is a compelling case to test guessability. First, it is a predominantly rural state where poverty is pervasive, all poverty alleviation policies have made some progress in recent years. According to estimates based on consumption data from the 2004-5 National Social Survey, Rajasthan has a rural poverty rate of 19%, which is modestly below the 22.5% average for Indian states and substantially below the 29% all-India rural poverty rate (Dev and Ravi 2007).[11] Selecting a state with a significant rural poverty rate is necessary as a consensus of scholarship finds that parties primary target poor voters with clientelistic benefits and find monitoring most feasible in low-density areas (See Brusco et al. 2004;

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[10] Along similar lines, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012) find that skill, proxied as length of tenure in office, affects the ability of lower caste voters to divert government benefits implemented by local governments to co-ethnics.
[11] This takes into account the 17 most populous states.

Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).[12]

Second, a range of scholarship on India establishes its politics as patronage-based (Chandra 2004; 2007, 2009; Chhibber 2009; Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt 2013; Besley et al. 2007; Vaishnav 2012). Chandra (2004, 2011) defines India as a patronage democracy characterized by a dominant state sector that controls primary avenues to upward mobility and survival and discretion over *individualized* provision of jobs and services.[13] Moreover, drawing on data from Rajasthan, Krishna (2007, 2011) argues that one of the most important changes in Indian politics is the emergence of small-time leaders capable of navigating the state on the behalf of poor citizens to obtain benefits from an unresponsive state (See also Chhibber 2009). Politicians covet these fixers who they believe can deliver the votes of their supporters during elections (See Manor 2000). The mechanism of voting for the candidate advocated by a patron who facilitates access to state benefits or services is consistent with clientelism and incentives to perform on guessability-- if the contingency of these transactions is as contingent as theory suggests. Work by Dunning and Nilekani (2013) and Bussell (2011) also suggests that party-voter linkages shape access to selective benefits and the strategies voters pursue to access government benefits and services. In short, research suggests that patronage politics is entrenched in the Indian context and in Rajasthan specifically.

Third, Rajasthan is politically competitive with a 2-party system that has alternated between the BJP and Congress Party in every state assembly election cycle since 1993. Across five elections that have taken place at the time of writing, three had overall margins of victory in terms of vote share below 4%.[14] Moving down to variation across state assembly constituencies, the average margin of victory across Rajasthan legislative assembly constituencies in 2003 and 2008 was 8.7% and 8.9%.[15] Fourth, Rajasthan's party system is institutionalized relative to other Indian states although its local party organization is believed to be weak as are parties throughout India, excluding the left parties (Lodha 2009; See Ziegfeld 2009; Krishna 2007; Kruks-Wisner 2010; Kohli 1990). Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) and Health (2005) place Rajasthan in the bottom third among major states for their respective measures of electoral volatility. This is moderate compared to state elections in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh where anti-incumbent swings of 30% or more have become common in recent years. Fourth,

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[12] Note that this literature considers low population density to be key. This can apply to small towns or small neighborhoods within towns as well as to rural areas.

[13] This takes into account reforms that liberalized the Indian economy and reduced the size of the state. She finds the state sector to retain dominance as a source of jobs, benefits, and services, particularly for the rural poor.

[14] In 1998 and 2012 the Congress Party and BJP won by 12% of the vote, respectively.

[15] For an alternative summary measure, the median margin of the vote in 2008 was 6.6%.

Rajasthan is a state where ethnic identity is a salient predictor of partisanship and fall in the middle of the distribution of Huber and Suryanarayan's measure of party voting polarization, which measures the extent of party polarization across sub-castes across Indian states in 1999 and 2004.

In sum, Rajasthan offers a context of moderate poverty, electoral competition, politically salient ethnic identity, and electoral uncertainty at the state and constituency levels. The level of competition and party alternation in Rajasthan and across Indian states adds an important dimension to the analysis of guessability. Studies of clientelism are often conducted in contexts where the votes of the poor are disproportionately courted by one party machine (Magaloni 2008; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes 2005; Brusco et al. 2004; Medina and Stokes 2007). Rajasthan provides a case of frequent party alternation in which the poor are courted by multiple parties (Thachil and Herring 2008; See also Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Corstange 2008). In this context, efficiency in the targeting of benefits should be highly valued and resource constraints may be more strict due to limits on access to state resources where incumbent parties are unlikely to be in power in the next term. This should incentivize brokers of both parties to market their ability to deliver votes and collect accurate information on voters' political preferences.

4.2.   The Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Raj in India

Local elites surveyed in this project are elected gram panchayat (village council) presidents. The gram panchayat (GP) is the lowest tier of India's three-tier local government or Panchayat Raj system, falling below elected bodies at the District (zilla parishad) and sub-district or block (Panchayat Samiti) levels.[16] The panchayat raj system in some form has been in existence prior to independence and was a constitutional priority of MK Gandhi. The 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution passed in 1993 gave the Panchayat Raj system constitutional status, which imposed federal requirements for direct elections of panchayat members, further integration of local government and government development functions, and quotas for women and marginal groups. As a result, 227,698 gram panchayats were staffed by over two million elected representatives across India by the year 2000. GP boundaries are based on population and consist of one large village or as many as 35 smaller villages.[17] Each gram panchayat in Rajasthan has one directly elected GP President and directly elected ward members for

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[16] Note that gram panchayat boundaries are based on administrative units and are not nested within electoral districts as a rule. However, in this study, all the GPs sampled from a selected block are within one state assembly constituency.
[17] GPs in Rajasthan modally have populations below 3,000 people. This data comes from Rajasthan Government population estimates from 2000. See: http://www.rajsec.rajasthan.gov.in/secraj/pan_partA-3.htm. In my survey data, there are 750 households per GP on average.

each ward. The number of wards in one gram panchayat also depends on population. In Rajasthan there are nearly 9,200 gram panchayats with approximately 114,000 elected members.[18]

Gram panchayats and higher tiers of the panchayat raj system have also aggressively implemented quotas for women and marginal groups: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward (middle) castes. As of 2010, 50% of seats were reserved for women, up from 35%. 2008 figures on marginal group quotas in Rajasthan show that 21%, 18%, and 42% of elected seats were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes. Also, eligibility status based on these quotas rotates with each new election cycle, which makes it is extremely unlikely that the same politician will be eligible for re-election (See Dunning and Nilekani 2013). This creates high turnover and impacts the distribution of political experience of GP politicians as can be seen by the large number of sarpanch in the elite survey serving their first term.

Third, along with state and parliamentary elections, the upper two (of three) tiers of the panchayat raj conduct officially partisan elections, which permit party symbols on the ballot. Party symbols are not permitted on the ballot at the lowest tier or gram panchayat level. The election commission ban on party symbols in GP elections aimed to make elections at the village level personal rather than partisan; however, parties have penetrated the GP (Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Parties use the GP as a recruiting tool for higher-level nominations within the panchayat raj system and GP politicians often depend on higher-level partisan politicians such as MLAs and representatives of the higher tiers of the Panchayat Raj for electoral support or funds for pork projects and serve as aids to higher-level politicians.[19]Voter awareness of GP politicians' partisan preferences is also high. To illustrate, 82% of surveyed voters in Karnataka and 96% in Rajasthan correctly identified the party of the GP President—according to a 2012 voter survey presented in Dunning and Nilekani (2013).

Finally, the gram panchayat has responsibility for identifying the beneficiaries of targeted benefits from state and national welfare schemes—a task which includes collecting information on residents to improve targeting of those benefits. This is consistent with the depiction of local middlemen in other contexts where clientelism or elite capture are suspected (Stokes 2005; Olken 2013; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012; Calvo and Murillo 2013). To the extent that manipulation of these policies exists

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[18] 2008 Figures. Government of Rajasthan: <http://www.nird.org.in/Rural%20Development%20Statistics%202011-12/data/sec-9.pdf>
[19] In another paper with Neelanjan Sircar, I also find strong evidence that GP Presidents prefer to target benefits to co-partisans.

in the form of political clientelism, gram panchayat politicians, particularly GP Presidents, play a role in targeting that reflects this (Besley et al. 2007; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Markussen 2010).[20] Moreover, other research suggests that GP Presidents selectively provide access to higher level contacts in bureaucracies or elective office, which is necessary for citizens to obtain favors or benefits from an unresponsive state (Krishna 2011; Bussell 2011; Bjorkman 2013; Kruks-Wisner 2010; See also Chhibber 2009). Contrary to the view by Manor (2000) and Krishna (2009) that fixers or new leaders are independent from the state, observations in fieldwork suggest that while many local brokers may not be elected to the GP, it is very likely that elected GP politicians, or their husbands or close family members, perform functions akin to those of brokers (See Kruks-Wisner 2011). This claim is bolstered by findings that citizens contact GP politicians more than activists in party organizations or state personnel (See Bussell 2011; Kruks-Wisner 2011).[21]

5.   Survey Instrument and Sampling

Elite and voter surveys were conducted in Rajasthan from January to February 2013. The voter survey includes questions on political and social ties to politicians interviewed in the elite survey and higher level politicians; past and expected vote choice (using a secret ballot instrument); a battery of questions on political participation and the partisan makeup of individuals tied to respondents by kinship or friendship; and demographics. The elite survey, conducted the day after the voter survey was completed in each GP, includes items on elite characteristics such as political experience and family political ties; career characteristics; ties to higher level elites; demographics; and questions on perceptions of voters' political preferences. In this section, I describe the survey instrument used to create the guessability measure, survey sampling design, and present descriptive statistics for the elite and voter samples.

5.1.   Survey Instrument

The *guessability* measure is defined by a match between voters' self-reported vote choice in the vote intention and 2008 state assembly elections items and GP Presidents' guesses about voters' preferences. I report guessability on the 2008 vote choice item as a robustness check; however, due to

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[20] According to responses from an elite survey conducted in Rajasthan by Dunning and Nilekani (2013), voters and GP politicians identified GP Presidents as more influential than bureaucrats and other GP members when it comes to welfare distribution.

[21] This claim is also supported by survey data showing that 92% of sarpanch report canvasing for a candidate in an election campaign in the past 5 years.

recall concerns, I center the statistical analysis on the rate of correct guesses for the vote intention question: *If an MLA (state assembly) election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you support?* This question captures voters' current partisan preferences approximately 9 months before the next state elections. In the elite survey, I ask sarpanch which party he or she thinks a voter sampled from his GP would support if a state assembly election were held tomorrow and which he supported in 2008. Elite respondents were shown a sheet of 10 photographs of sampled voters including information provided in the electoral roles: name, father's name, and house number.[22] GP Presidents were asked about all 10 voters sampled from their gram panchayat.

The survey instrument for the vote intentions and 2008 vote choice items for voters and local elites follows and standard secret ballot design used previously for Rajasthan respondents in post-poll surveys carried out by Lokniti (Delhi). Respondents were given a ballot paper with party symbols. They were asked to check the box next to the party symbol they preferred and then to fold the ballot and insert it into a sealed ballot box. Interviewers assured respondents of their anonymity and insisted that the respondent not show them their completed ballot to ensure the ballot was credibly secret.[23]

5.2. Sampling

The survey sampled 96 gram panchayats in 7 districts, 12 sub-districts (or blocks) and 6 of Rajasthan's 7 administrative divisions.[24] The sample frame aims to generalize to voters and GP politicians in rural contexts with a moderately high share of households below the poverty line and inter-party competition. To sample this population, I used 2001 census data on the rural composition of blocks,[25] data from the Government of Rajasthan on the share of below poverty line (BPL) households across blocks in 2001, and election commission data on political competition in panchayat samiti elections—the second tier of the panchayat raj system which aligns with blocks. I restricted my sample to blocks with a 75% rural population according to the 2001 census to reduce the chance of sampling GPs that function as suburbs. I also excluded blocks with less than 20% of households in the (BPL) category in 2001-- to ensure that the chance of sampling voters eligible for anti-poverty programs at random was non-trivial—and excluded blocks where the median margin of victory across block-level

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[22] See the appendix for an example from one GP.

[23] As a caveat, it should be noted that parties in India do not release the candidate list for state assembly elections until approximately one month before elections. Also note ballot boxes were not opened for coding until the research team existed the gram panchayat.

[24] Rajasthan has 33 districts, 249 blocks, 7 administrative divisions, and 9177 gram panchayats in all.

[25] Note that data on the share of BPL households across gram panchayats was from 2001. The new BPL card distribution expected to occur prior to fieldwork was delayed and so no more recent data was available.

(Panchayat Samiti) ward elections was greater than 15 percent.[26] After this restriction was applied, approximately 60 of 249 blocks were eligible for sampling. Logistical concerns required that we sample two blocks in each district to the extent possible. This reduced the list to approximately 50 blocks. I randomly sampled one district in 5 of Rajasthan's seven divisions from a pool of districts in which 3 or more blocks were eligible for sampling according to these criteria.[27] From this list, 2 blocks were randomly selected from the pool of eligible blocks in each district. In Udaipur, the sixth division selected, 3 eligible blocks did not exist in any one district. As a practical alternative, I randomly selected one block each from two neighboring districts in the division: Udaipur and Rajsamand.

Once 12 blocks were sampled, I collected data on political competition across gram panchayats. As electoral commission data on gram panchayat elections is not available from a centralized source and the ballot in GP elections legally bans party symbols, this data was collected through interviews. Members of my research team and I interviewed block party presidents—party organizers immersed in the politics of gram panchayats in their block— who were asked to characterize the level of competition between Congress and the BJP as non-competitive, somewhat competitive, or very competitive. Of the 452 GPs in 12 sampled blocks, 180 were described as non-competitive, 133 as somewhat competitive, and 139 as very competitive. To increase the chance that the target population would be sampled, given resource constraints, non-competitive GPs were dropped from the pool for sampling. In each block, I randomly selected 4 GPs among those coded as somewhat competitive and very competitive respectively. I then randomly selected one ward in each sampled GP and sampled household from the gram panchayat voters' list provided by the election commission.[28] I sampled (predominantly male) heads of household in randomly sampled households because they are generally the household member most engaged in village politics and citizen-state relations.[29] The elite survey was fielded the day after the vote survey was completed in a given GP. I illustrate the steps in sampling in figure 1 below.

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[26] The panchayat samiti is the second tier of the panchayat raj. Each member of this block-level legislative body is elected from one single member ward and elected according to a first past the post electoral rule. I use the median margin of victory across ward election in each panchayat samiti as gram panchayat electoral data could not be obtained.

[27] Rajasthan has 7 divisions, which include 4 to 6 districts each.

[28] This was done because the elite survey samples one ward member in each GP for analysis not included in this paper. To analyze ward-voter ties, all sampled voters must live in one GP member's ward.

[29] To identify heads of household, interviewers were instructed to request to speak to the head of household upon approaching each sampled household. If heads of household were not at home, interviewers were instructors to either interview them on the fields in which many of them worked or to return to the household later in the day. If they did not return, supervisors provided alternative respondents who were also randomly selected from a voters list.

Figure 1: Sampling Design

5.3.   The Sample

95 GP Presidents were interviewed in the elite survey across 95 gram panchayats (village councils).[30] A few characteristics are worth pointing out.[31] First, 54 percent (51 respondents) of GP Presidents are male and 46 percent (44 respondents) are female. This is close to the gender composition we would expect given the adoption of quotas for women at the 50% level in 2010. Second, 36% of sarpanch come from marginal groups: scheduled caste and schedule tribes. This is comparable to the reservation rate for these groups. Third, 38% of GP Presidents received some secondary education or studied beyond that level while 82% of are literate. Fourth, sarpanch reported above average land holdings with an average of 15 to 18 bighas (4-5 acres). 44% reported the highest level of landholdings on the survey at 25 bighas (6+ acres) or more. Fifth, the overwhelming majority of sarpanch (92%)

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[30] One of 96 sarpanch was not available at the time of the elite survey.
[31] I provide descriptive statistics for GP Presidents and voters in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

reported that they participated in canvassing for higher-level political campaigns such as MLA and zilla parishad (district level elected government) and sarpanch reported knowing 95% of voter respondents cross-referenced in the elite survey. This paints a portrait of a politicized sample of politicians drawn from a more educated and richer demographic than the average population.

In the voter survey, 959 voters were interviewed across 96 gram panchayats. Several characteristics of the sample are worth pointing out. First, landholdings are skewed toward the lowest category on the survey, which ranges between landless and 3 bighas (.75 acres). This is expected as blocks were restricted to those with 20% of households below the poverty line. Second, the illiteracy rate for interviewed heads of household, which are overwhelmingly male, is high relative to Rajasthan's male illiteracy rate of 19.5% according to the 2011 census. This difference reflects the sampling choice. Third, voter turnout in state elections is high (91%) among heads of household.

6.   Results for Guessability: Descriptive Statistics

I present descriptive statistics on guessability in this section. First, I show aggregate results indicating guessability is lower than expected relative to the expectation in the literature. Second, I compare the guessability rates I observe to low-information benchmarks that do not require brokers.

Guessability Rates

We can see in table 1 that GP Presidents guess voters' partisan preferences incorrectly 35.5% of the time. [32] I also find that GP presidents in seats reserved for women, most of whom are housewives,[33] or members of the lower status marginal groups of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, who are significantly less educated than members of higher status castes, do not perform significantly differently on guessability than their male or upper caste counterparts. Comparison-in-means t-tests show no significant difference in guessability rates between women and men or marginal groups and higher status caste groups.[34] I also find that guessability rates aggregated to the GP as a whole line up with the results in table 1;[35] Sarpanch on average guessed the partisan preferences of voters in their GP correctly 64.8% and 65.7% of the time on the vote intentions item and 2008 vote choice recall measure

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[32] It should be noted that the results I present are based on survey data with several restrictions that ensure my measure of guessability is conservative. I discuss this in the appendix.

[33] 68% of female sarpanch reported their occupations as housewives.

[34] I also no find no effect for sarpanch gender or marginal caste identity in full multi-level models

[35] This captures guessability rates for a sarpanch across all the voters he was asked about in the survey.

respectively.[36] In a competitive environment where margins of victors are generally below 10%, this level of incorrect guesses is substantively large.

<p align="center">Table 1: Aggregate Guessability Among GP Presidents (Restricted)[37]</p>

	Vote Intention	**2008 State Elections**
Incorrect Guesses	286 (35.5%)	287 (34.5%)
Correct Guesses	520 (64.5%)	544 (65.5%)
Total Observations	806 (100%)	802 (100%)

Benchmarks of Guessability. What does a guessability rate of 64.5% say about the level of information local politicians in rural Rajasthan have on voters in their gram panchayats? I show here that local politicians not only get the partisan preferences of many voters wrong, but get them wrong to a degree that matches or is worse than alternatives that do not require the presence of brokers at all. In a two-party system, the least impressive benchmark is random chance or 50%-- equivalent to guessing partisan preferences by flipping a coin between Rajasthan's two major parties: Congress and the BJP. Guessability rates on vote intentions and 2008 vote choice items exceed random chance in the aggregate. Guessability aggregated to the GP (or sarpanch respondent) shows 69.6% (64 of 92) and 67% (62 of 92) GP Presidents performing above the .5 random chance benchmark.

The second benchmark compares observed guessability rates against the rates that would have occurred if party leaders used publicly available results from the Rajasthan state assembly election post-poll surveys conducted after the 2003and 2008 elections by Lokniti, a national survey institute in India. Published in newspapers at the time, these results include aggregate statewide vote shares for BJP and Congress across major caste groups and Muslims.[38] I develop a blunt yet plausible decision rule based on voting patterns across these ethnic categories as follows. When the difference in vote share between support for the Congress Party or BJP (averaged between the 2003 and 2008 elections) among Muslims or members of broad caste categories is greater than or equal to 15% in Rajasthan as a whole, sarpanch guess that 100% of members of that group supported that party. When the difference in vote share for that group is less than 15%, sarpanch guess that half of the members of that group will support either the Congress or BJP. Since Rajasthan is a two-party system, this simple decision rule assumes no guesses of

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[36] This means aggregate results are not driven by a few low performing sarpanch but reflects a general pattern.
[37] I present raw numbers followed by percentages of observations in the sample.
[38] These groups include Muslims, forward castes, Jats, Gurjars, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes (middle peasant castes), which exclude Jats.

third party support.[39] This means all voters who prefer Rajasthan's comparatively weak third parties will be guessed incorrectly by this decision rule.[40] This decision rule is conservative and plausibly worse than the performance we would expect from local politicians living amongst the voters whose partisan preferences they were asked to guess. If GP presidents in my survey followed this decision rule, they would have achieved an aggregate guessability rate of 75.9%. This far exceeds the guessability rate of 64.5% I observe in the pooled sample. If we apply this benchmark to guessability rates aggregated by GP, 37% of sarpanch reach this benchmark. This means that an outsider who followed this simple decision rule would far out-perform aggregate guessability rates of local politicians immersed in these voters' social networks.

Third, I fit a minimalist multinomial logit model on partisan preferences based voters' self-reported vote intentions. I include jati (sub-caste), self-reported land holdings, and block fixed effects. This model provides a low-information benchmark based on the most visible demographic information that I expect most villagers can easily observe. This model correctly predicts observed vote intentions 65.3% of the time as compared to an overall guessability rate of 64.5% in the pooled sarpanch. Comparing the predictive power of this model to guessability rates aggregated by GP, 59.8% of Sarpanch reach this benchmark. This suggests that performance on guessability for local politicians immersed in the social networks of voters is roughly indistinguishable from a simplistic demographic model pitched at a high level of aggregation. In sum, aggregate measures of guessability based on the vote intention and 2008 vote choice measures are consistently lower than expected and observed guessability performs no better or far worse than simple, information-poor methods for identifying voters' partisan preferences.

7.   Explaining Variation in Guessability: Regression Analysis

In this section, I test for the observable implications of three broad mechanisms that apply to a low or high information explanation for variation in guessability: the default observability mechanism, which depends on stereotypes about group-party linkages and visible partisan cues; the perverse accountability view,[41] which depends on broker quality, and the co-partisan networks view, which suggests information will flow within co-partisan networks but not outside them. I lay out the empirical

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[39] Sarpanch guessed third parties for 5 of 800 voters in the restricted samples and all 5 were incorrect, so the 2-party focus fits with sarpanch behavior as well.
[40] See Appendix Table 4 for details on the how guesses based on this decision rule compare to observed sarpanch guesses.
[41] This is the name Stokes (2005) uses for a mechanism in which parties hold voters accountable for how they vote rather than voters holding parties accountable for how they govern. This is the core element of the quid pro quo logic of clientelism.

strategy and then test the observable implications of these mechanisms.

7.1.   Empirical Model

To assess the relationship between voter and elite characteristics on guessability, I estimate a set of varying-intercept multilevel logistic regression models of the following form:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(\alpha_j + \beta X_i + \gamma U_{j[i]} + \varepsilon_{ij}) \tag{1}$$

$$\alpha_j \sim N(U_{j\gamma}, \sigma_\alpha^2) \tag{2}$$

The outcome y_i is a binary indicator for whether or not a GP President correctly guessed the party a voter reported that he would support if a state assembly election were to be held tomorrow.[42] A value of 1 represents a match between voter responses on this item and a local politician's guess about a particular voter's partisan preferences. β represents a vector of coefficients on voter and dyadic characteristics: indicators for ethnicity and wealth quintiles, voter-level political characteristics, co-partisanship, and co-ethnicity. γ_j is a vector of elite characteristics (indexed by voters): education, tenure, family connections in politics, measures of elite contact, and political characteristics. a_j are gram panchayat random effects modeled by a group-level intercept and a normally distributed error term.

The varying-intercept, or random effects, multi-level model can be interpreted as a model with a different intercept for guessability on voters in each GP.[43] The voter-level model in equation 1 and model of GP intercepts in equation 2 are estimated simultaneously. Multi-level modeling is an appropriate estimation strategy for this analysis for several reasons. First, multi-level modeling allows us to account for individual and group-level variation when estimating group-level coefficients—namely the modeled group (GP) intercepts in this case. Multilevel modeling allows me to model gram panchayat random effects as well as elite predictors at the level of gram panchayat. Second, unlike classical regression, which treats all observations as independent, multilevel approaches allow researchers to use all the information that is available but have correctly estimated standard errors with clustered data. This is because multilevel modeling represents a compromise between the two extremes

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[42] Other parties were grouped together into a single category due to the small number of observations in narrower categories. If a politician guessed OTHER and a voter chose a party other than Congress or BJP, guessability was coded 1.
[43] Recall there is one GP President sampled for each GP.

of completely pooling the data and estimating separate models for each group (no pooling). By "partially pooling" estimates, multilevel modeling considers pooled and un-pooled information and weighs that information according to the sample size of the groups and the within and between-group variation (Gelman and Hill 2007).

I present results from multi-level logistic regressions below. I focus the discussion on the vote intention measure of guessability, but provide confidence intervals for guessability on the 2008 vote choice measure as a robustness check. The vote intention measure captures partisan preferences on the day of the survey, which was completed 9 months before the Rajasthan assembly elections that took place in December 2013. The 2008 vote choice measure is based on voters' recall of their vote choice in an election that occurred 4 years ago. This means that it cannot be used to test claims on vote monitoring—due to recall bias as a result of time and changes in attitudes toward the incumbent Congress Party government after 4 years of rule—but can show consistency across measures that should move in the same direction. Regression tables on both dependent variables are in the appendix.

7.2   The Default Observability Mechanism

In this section, I test for the observable implications of the default observability mechanism. According to the default mechanism, politicians who lack more fine-grained information use information shortcuts based on perceptions of group-party linkages and the observed political behavior of individuals to identify voters' partisan preferences. This mechanism at the group level suggests that sarpanch observe a voter's ethnic identity—namely caste and religion-- and guess their partisan preferences based on the priors they have for whether that particular group supports the BJP, Congress Party, or a smaller third party. Thus, sarpanch should be better able to guess the partisan preferences of voters from ethnic groups when the information shortcut that a voters' ethnicity provides on their partisan preferences is most reliable. This should be the case for groups with more polarized partisan preferences (core groups) as compared to those with more heterogeneous or volatile preferences (swing groups). In Rajasthan, ethnic groups historically aligned with Congress include scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and Muslims. Ethnic groups aligned with the BJP include upper caste groups: Rajputs and Brahmins.[44] Jats, an upwardly mobile peasant caste officially identified as another backward caste, Meenas, an upwardly mobile scheduled tribe, and to a lesser extent, and Other Backward Castes (excluding Jats), to a lesser extent, have more heterogeneous preferences. Jats and Meenas have a

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[44] As a caveat, Lodha (2009) notes that Congress has made inroads into the BJP's Rajput support base since 2009.

particularly powerful impact on Rajasthan's swing vote against incumbent governments.[45] I also test for cues rooted in class-party linkages according to the same information short-cut logic.

I use the following measures to test the group-level implication of the default observability mechanism. First, I create indicator variables for politically relevant ethnic groups in Rajasthan. I include indicators for upper castes, which includes a number of Brahmin sub-castes; members of the influential upper caste Rajput sub-caste; Jats; a residual category of OBCs that excludes Jats; a number of jatis classified as scheduled castes; Meenas; scheduled tribes (excluding Meenas); and Muslims.[46] Second, following the method proposed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I code socio-economic status using a standardized wealth index based on 15 asset items in the voter survey with weights derived from principal component analysis. I split the distribution on this index measure into wealth quintiles.[47]

At the voter-level, I expect sarpanch who overwhelmingly know voters in their gram panchayats to observe voters' public partisan behaviors such as attending campaign rallies. If brokers invest effort in identifying the partisan preferences of voters, they should pay attention to public signals of partisan preferences that require minimal effort to observe. Thus, sarpanch should be better at identifying the partisan preferences of voters who report high levels of political participation of the type that is publicly displayed. To measure this, I created a composite participation index that includes binary questions on whether or not a voter reported participating in one of four public political activities in the last 5 years: attending a rally, attending a party meeting, putting a party flag in front of their home, and canvassing for a candidate during an election campaign. I sum the number of these activities a voter reports to have participated in and weight the sum by two standard deviations to capture large changes in levels of public political participation. I also include a behavioral measure for swing voters along the lines of Brader and Tucker (2001). This is a measure of whether the party a voter reported to have supported in the 2008 state elections and the party they intend to support in the vote intention item do not match.[48]

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[45] Other Backward Castes are an official category of historically disadvantages castes. This category is separate from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

[46] Note that I classify Muslims as a single group even though they reported various caste identities. I do so because Muslims are treated as an ethnic voting bloc in most analyses of Indian electoral behavior. I code caste categories by locating respondent-reported sub-castes (or jatis) in a Rajasthan codebook of jatis according to caste categories provided by MORSEL and check this against a codebook produced Lokniti, a national survey institute based in Delhi.

[47] The asset items included in the composite measure of wealth are as follows: numbers of rooms in the respondent's home, number of buffalo, number of cows, self-reported land holdings (bighas), and indicator variables for the following asset: a houses is made of concrete and brick (pakka), a separate kitchen, a fan, a car/jeep/van, a tractor, scooter or motor bike, TV, toilet, fridge, electric pump set for irrigation, mobile phone, bicycle, and computer.

[48] I choose a behavioral measure instead of the standard measure of a lack of expressed partisanship according to the party-closeness survey measure. The behavioral measure better captures party-voter ties in an environment where ideology is a less salient feature of party cleavages. I included this measure as well in earlier models and it had no effect.

The swing voter measure simply shows if a voter characteristic that make guessability particularly difficult is negatively correlated with guessability as expected by the logic of this mechanism. I present regression results for vote intention and 2008 vote choice measures of guessability that test the default observability mechanism tables 5 and 6 in the in appendix; confidence intervals for model 3 are presented in figure 2.

Default Observability Mechanism: Regression Results

The results show clear support for the group-level component of the default observability mechanism for both vote intention and 2008 vote recall measures of guessability. This mechanism predicts that sarpanch are more likely to identify voters' partisan preferences when they belong to groups that are strongly identified with one of the main political parties in Rajasthan. I use scheduled castes—a low caste group strongly aligned with the Congress Party—as a baseline ethnic group. Confidence intervals in figure 3 show that Jats and Meenas are substantially more difficult to guess than core groups.[49] These groups typically swing elections against the party in power at the state level (See Jaffrelot and Kumar 2011).[50] In substantive terms, coefficients on indicators for Jats and Meenas decrease sarpanch guessability rates by 5.6 and 5.4 percentage points compared to the scheduled caste category, holding income quintiles and political characteristics at their median. Put another way, sarpanch guessed Jats' and Meenas' vote intentions correctly approximately 60% of the time as compared to 66% for scheduled castes.

To illustrate how group effects map onto group-party linkages, I plot the relationship between party distance—measured as the difference in the percent of group members who feel closest to Congress and the BJP-- and guessability across major ethnic categories in Rajasthan. I use survey data collected by Thad Dunning in 2011 to calculate party distance.[51] He asked respondents which party they felt closest to, forcing all respondents to name a party regardless of whether or not they were partisans. To compensate for Dunning's lack of Meena respondents I calculate party distance for this group based on the difference between the share of Meena Congress and BJP partisans in my survey data.[52] I plot the

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[49] Note that the baseline group of scheduled castes in particularly identified with Congress. In his 2011 survey of Rajasthan, Thad Dunning found 75% of his large sample of Scheduled Castes to feel closest to the Congress Party. The result on Rajputs should be understood relative to this baseline. Interestingly this group's vote preferences are strongly toward the BJP but sarpanch guessed Rajput's partisan preferences close to 50/50 across Congress and BJP.

[50] For example, according to Lokniti election post-poll surveys, margins in Jat support swung from favoring the BJP by 13% in 2003 to supporting Congress by 1% in 2008.

[51] These data are aggregated at the state level. Note that Dunning's sample included only one Meena respondent. Therefore, I calculate party distance for Meenas using the 2008 vote recall question in my survey.

[52] Note my survey measure, unlike Dunning's, only asked those who are partisans of any party to name the party to which

relationship between party distance and guessability aggregated by major ethnic groups in figure 3. We see here that Jats and Meenas fall below the line of random chance and that guessability tends to be higher for voters from groups with higher levels of party distance.

Next, I consider the marginal effect of socio-economic status on guessability. In figure 2, I compare guessability rates across wealth quintiles and exclude the middle wealth quintile as a baseline category. I find that guessability is significantly higher for the poorest and richest quintiles compared to the baseline middle wealth quintile. This makes intuitive sense because the richest voters tend to be more aligned with the BJP while the poorest groups are more likely to be aligned with the Congress Party.[53] For example, taking the average party distance across the 2008 vote recall and vote intention measures for five wealth quintiles, party distances for the richest and poorest quintiles are 28 and 34 percent respectively. The three middle wealth quintiles do not exceed party distances of 15 percent. Belonging to the poorest or richest wealth quintiles translates respectively to a 4 and 4.6 percentage point increase in the probability that the partisan preference of a voter from the poorest and richest quintiles will be guessed correctly compared to a voter from the middle wealth quintile.

Moving to individual characteristics, I expected brokers to infer partisan preferences by observing voters' public displays of partisanship through political participation. In a local rural context, we should expect local politicians to be able to observe who publicly participates in partisan activities such as canvassing in campaigns and attending party rallies. We can see in figure 2 that the public political participation measure does not reach statistically significance and has a point estimate close to zero. The measure used here captures an increase of two standard in the composite sum measure of public political participation. This means when we move from voters with very low to very high levels of participation that the effect on guessability remains close to zero.[54] Finally for the default observability mechanism, sarpanch perform substantially worse on guessability for swing voters based on the behavioral measure of changes in the party a respondent says he support in the last state elections and the party he would support on the vote intentions item. Sarpanch are 4.4 percentage points less likely to correctly identify swing voters than voters whose vote preferences match across 2008 and vote intention items. This effect holds for all models of guessability for sarpanch across both measures. In sum, results on the observable

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[53] they feel closest.

I also expect the richest voters to be easier to guess because they tend to be the most prominent members of their villages. These groups are also most likely to interact with the gram panchayat to seek anti-poverty benefits or favors. The rich may be more socially connected to the local political elite and may otherwise approach sarpanch for favors such as approving permits rather than to access benefits from welfare schemes as the poor are likely to do.

[54] This holds for both guessability measures as well as models in which I include only the largest component of the participation index: rally attendance.

implications of the default observability mechanism suggests that sarpanch depend on information shortcuts based on group-party linkages; they do not tend to observe cues to voters' partisanship from their participation in public political activities. The data support a low-information mechanism for guessability based on information shortcuts from group-party linkages.

Figure 2: Effects of Voter Characteristics on Guessability

Figure 3: Variation in Guessability By Group Party Distance (Dunning 2011)

7.3   Perverse Accountability Mechanism

In this section, I test observable implications of the perverse accountability mechanism. According to this mechanism, brokers should be able to identify partisan preferences and monitor votes through their central location in local social networks and skill in collecting information on voters.[55] In the aggregate results, I show that brokers in India perform worse at identifying voters' partisan preferences than theory in the clientelism literature would predict. To test the observable implications of this mechanism on variation in guessability across voter and elite characteristics, I assess the relationship between measures of three components of broker quality and guessability: basic capacity, experience, and connections.

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[55] 'Perverse accountability' refers to the ability of parties to punish voters for how they vote rather than the standard type of accountability in which votes hold politicians accountable for their performance.

Basic capacity refers to the basic ability a sarpanch has to navigate the gram panchayat in order to target benefits to his constituents or mobilize voters. I measure basic capacity with a measure of educational attainment (See Besley et al. 2005; Krishna 2003). The level of a sarpanch's educational attainment affects his ability to understand the powers of his office and navigate complex bureaucratic procedures that affect his ability to target benefits to his constituents. Educational attainment may also capture unobserved attributes associated with competence that affect guessability. To measure education, I use an ordinal variable with a range of 0 to 12 according to years of education and divide by two standard deviations to capture large increases in education from the bottom category of illiterate. Experience captures variation in the knowledge a sarpanch has of the gram panchayat—which is important for a sarpanch who aims to target state benefits to his constituents—and local political power through a sarpanch's ability to win plurality elections to the ward or sarpanch more than once.[56] (See Cox and Katz 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012). I measure experience directly as tenure: the number of terms a sarpanch served in the GP as either GP president or GP ward member. As an indirect measure, I include an indicator for whether or not a relative of a sarpanch respondent currently has a relative who currently holds elected office or did so in the past.[57] This as an indirect measure of experience because belonging to a local political family gives a sarpanch experience interacting with villagers in a political or social work capacity prior to becoming sarpanch.[58]

Third, I include measures of the self-reported frequency of contact between sarpanch and higher-level leaders including MLAs (state legislators) and representatives of the two upper tiers of the panchayat raj system: panchayat samiti (block-level) and zilla parishad (district level). Connections reflect broker quality because village politicians with greater access to higher-level politicians are more likely to be agents of these higher-level politicians. When local brokers have close ties to higher-level politicians, they are more likely to be capable of granting favors to their supporters and more likely to be incentivized to perform on guessability. I measure contact through responses to questions that ask sarpanch how many times they have met a particular individual in the last month. Responses vary along a 5-point scale from zero meetings in a month to more than one meeting weekly. Predictably these answers are slightly inflated with a mean of one meeting per month for all three politicians. To correct

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[56] Work in American Politics on the Incumbency effect in house elections argues that tenure captures unobserved skills characteristics as well.

[57] Respondents also were asked to provide details on the position, years that person held this post, and relative involved.

[58] More specifically, in a context of rotating quotas along gender lines, we may expect a sarpanch who has a husband or other close family member who held elective office to depend on these family members.

for this I create a standardized variable weighted by two standard deviations to capture significant increases in the frequency of sarpanch-reported meetings.[59] Finally, I include an indicator for self-identified party activists. This is not a measure of broker quality, but is understand to capture motivation.

Perverse Accountability Mechanism: Regression Results

Evidence presented in figure 4 below does not support the perverse accountability mechanism. None of the measures of basic capacity and experience achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Education, whether modeled as a series of indicators for primary, middle, secondary, and post-secondary education (not included here) or as the blunt effect of a change in two standard deviations in years of educational attainment (included here) has no significant impact on guessability. In fact, illiterates and the highly educated are statistically indistinguishable on guessability. Second, neither tenure in the village council or belonging to a political family has a significant or substantial effect on guessability.[60] Third, I present results on the self-reported frequency of contact between sarpanch and higher-level leaders including India's powerful MLAs (state legislators) and representatives of the two tiers of the panchayat raj system above village councils: panchayat samiti (block-level) and zilla parishad (district level). Confidence intervals show no substantive effect with respect to contact with higher-level politicians; the only effect that reaches statistical significance is contact with a state assembly legislator (MLA), which is negative. As a whole, this suggests that political connections do not have a positive effect on guessability.[61] Fourth, I included sarpanch land holdings and relative land holdings-- coded as the difference between mean self-reported land holdings among voter survey respondents in a GP and self-reported land holdings of the sarpanch in that GP—as a control in earlier models. [62] Relative land holdings might impact guessability if brokers from economically dominant families are able to use their economic leverage in their local areas to identify voters' private political preferences. Relative land holding and total land holding in absolute terms modeled on their original

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[59] There is substantial variation on these variables with a standard deviation of approximately one point on the ordinal scale for measures of contact with all three politicians.

[60] As a caveat, the vast majority of sarpanch are first term sarpanch and variation on tenure in the GP overall is limited.

[61] As a caveat, although there is substantial variation, voters inflate their responses on self-reported contact measures. Therefore, this may be a noisy measure of political connections.

[62] Response choices for the self-reported land holdings measure vary by increments of 3 bighas (approximately .75 acres) on a scale of 1 to 9; the top category (9) captures those with > 25 bighas (approximately 6 acres) of land. The relative land holdings measure is the difference between mean land holdings on this measure for 10 voter survey respondents and the self-reported land holdings of the sarpanch.

scale and weighted by two standard deviations have no effect. I also included an interaction with the political family indicator to identify the relationship between politically and economically dominant families in the gram panchayat and found no effect. Thus, all measures of broker quality fail to independently impact guessability.

Broker Quality and Motivation

Finally, I consider the effect of motivation and its interaction with broker quality on guessability. I proxy for motivation with a survey question on whether or not a sarpanch is an active party member, which is akin to an activist in the Indian context. Local politicians who self-identify as party activists are likely to exhibit particularly strong connections to parties and partisan politicians and are likely to have interests in political careers beyond the GP. If guessability is a pre-requisite for executing a clientelistic strategy, which impacts vote mobilization, we should expect party activists to be particularly motivated to perform on guessability. Although active party membership has a positive effect on the 2008 vote recall measure of guessability before interactions are introduced, it does not have an independent effect for any model in the more dependable vote intention measure shows in table 7 of the appendix. I also consider the interaction between this proxy for motivation to perform on guessability and measures of broker quality. The Interaction between active party membership and one of four measure of broker quality shows a sizeable interaction effect: belonging to a political family. Activists who are also family members perform better than activists who are not family members by 2.3 percentage points, all else equal. One additional piece of evidence suggests that party activists are more motivated than sarpanch who are not party activists. I found in the first set of regressions on voter characteristics that voter participation has no impact on guessability; however, sarpanch who identify as party activists are 2.7 percentage points more likely to identify voters two standard deviations above the mean on the participation index—which translates roughly to those who participated in 3 to 4 (of 4) types of public political participation.

7.4   Co-Partisan Networks Mechanism

The Co-partisan networks mechanism suggests that a sarpanch will be more likely to guess a voter's partisan preference when he belongs to the same local co-partisan network. When this is the case, I expect that voter has revealed his partisan preference. Rather than investing effort to identify voters' partisan preferences, I expect brokers know co-partisan voters' preferences because the latter's

preference is routinely revealed through interaction. Regression results in figure 4 supports the co-partisan networks mechanism. A sarpanch is 3.2 percentage points more likely to correctly guess a voter's partisanship if he is a co-partisan than if he is a non-co-partisan. Importantly, I find no effect of co-ethnicity on guessability despite the prevalence of ethnically segregated social geography in rural Rajasthan.

To further demonstrate the impact of co-partisan ties on guessability, I estimate the effects of interactions, which I present in confidence intervals in figure 5.[63] We can see from these results that co-partisanship has a large positive effect on even the most negative results discussed above. First, co-ethnicity has a substantively large and significant effect when it is interacted with co-partisanship. Substantively, the probability of correctly identifying the partisan preference of a voter who shares partisanship and co-ethnicity (for the vote intention measure) is 6.7 percentage points higher than would be the case for a co-ethnic voter who is not a co-partisan, all else equal. Second, coefficients on interactions between co-partisanship and indicators for swing group, Jats and Meenas, flip dramatically to large and positive in regressions on both measures of guessability. These coefficients are inefficiently estimated, but show large estimates for the least guessable groups identified in tests of the default observability mechanism above. Evidence is also consistent with the co-partisan networks mechanism when we consider interactions between co-partisanship and contact between the GP President and panchayat samiti (block) representative-- the politician one level above the sarpanch.[64] When co-partisanship is taken into account, the effect of pachayat samiti contact flips from negative to positive and the effect is large across both measures of guessability. Among sarpanch who report meeting his panchayat samiti member representative weekly or more often (equivalent to two standard deviations above the mean), the probability of correctly identifying the partisan preference of a co-partisan voter is 3.7 percent points higher than would be the case at the same level of contact if the voter was a partisan of another political party. This suggests that political connections impact guessability when we locate them within co-partisan networks but not otherwise.

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[63] See model 3 in tables 7 and 8 in the appendix for multi-level regression tables.
[64] Note that education and measures of political experience do not have an impact as interactions or main effects.

Figure 4: Effects of Elite Characteristics on Guessability

Figure 5: Co-partisan Interaction Effects on Guessability

7.5   Robustness Checks on the Relationship Between Broker Quality and Guessability

As a robustness check, I consider selection concerns, which may affect my conclusion that broker quality does not explain variation in guessability. This would be the case if higher quality sarpanch are more likely to be elected in village councils where guessability is likely to be low. This is broadly plausible according to political economy literature which argues that political competition, like economic competition, drives up the quality of politicians and raises the political costs of poor performance (See De Paola and Scoppa 2011; Ashworth et al. 2006). I briefly and simply show that this is not the case when it comes to sarpanch in rural India. There are several reasons to expect the relationship others have found between competition and politician quality for mayors and national

politicians not to apply in this case. First, the position of sarpanch has quite limited resources at its disposal. Although sarpanch have discretion over local projects and some discretion over the selection of beneficiaries for welfare programs, state and federal governments often try to minimize local control to the extent possible. In fact, while evidence on this has changed in the past decade, Manor (2000) and Krishna (2003) did not find high quality brokers to be attracted to local governments during their fieldwork 15 years ago. Second, India's rotating quota system largely removes re-election incentives from the village council presidency because a sarpanch today is unlikely to be eligible to contest in the subsequent election. Third, sarpanch must reside in a very local space and elections to sarpanch are extremely personal as my survey data attests. For this selection issue to obtain, we would have to believe that either the pool of potential local politicians is higher quality in more competitive areas or that higher quality politicians are more incentivized to contest in more competitive areas. Where the stakes are low, this is unlikely the case.

To assess whether or not there is an empirical basis to this concern, I ran a series of simple bivariate regressions between data at the GP-level that captures the difficulty of guessing voters' partisan preferences and my measures of broker quality. To measure the difficulty of guessing voters' political preferences as a GP characteristic, I draw upon two measure of party distance presented thus far: the average difference in self-reported vote choice according to CSDS 2003 and 2008 state assembly election post-poll surveys and the difference is partisan preferences in Thad Dunning's 2011 survey.[65] I calculate the average party distance of sampled voters in a GP on both of these measures to capture the difficulty of partisan identifiability as a characteristic of gram panchayats. I also calculated the number of correct guesses across GPs on my guessability measure to test for a direct relationship between guessability and measures of broker quality. I find no statistically significant results in any of these simple regressions. I also find no relationship between measures of broker quality and whether the GP was highly competitive or somewhat competitive.[66] The measure of motivation—active party membership—shows that a sarpanch is more likely to be a party member where competition is lower.

To summarize results, evidence broadly suggests that guessability can be explained by two low information mechanisms: default guessability and co-partisan networks. Employing the default observability mechanism, sarpanch make educated guesses about voters' partisan preferences according

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[65] I use my data for Meenas in both since this is not reported in the CSDS data and there is not a sufficient Meena sample in Dunning's survey.
[66] Recall that this was coded according to block party leaders' assessments and is the only measure of variation in competition in my survey. I only sampled somewhat or very competitive GPs.

to their priors on the distribution of partisan preferences among voters' group identities. Sarpanch are also better at guessing voters' partisan preferences when they are located in their co-partisanship networks. The lack of an effect of co-ethnicity on guessability suggests that the co-partisanship effect fits the political networks mechanism rather than being a function of familiarity between sarpanch and voters who share social characteristics. Evidence does not support the assumption that brokers effectively extract private information on voters' political preferences despite the secret ballot. The sole positive result for a measure of broker quality-- the interaction between belonging to a political family and being a party activist-- increases guessability by only 2.3 percent.

It is important to understand the practical significance of these results. First, the larger point that guessability is low outside of partisan networks holds. Under the circumstances in which voter and elite characteristics make guessability highest—scheduled caste voters from the poorest wealth quintile who participate in visible political activities at levels two standard deviations above the mean and sarpanch who are activists with relatives in politics—guessability does not exceed 71 percent. In more typical cases guessability falls below 64%-- the percent of correct guesses in the pooled sample introduced early in this paper. Second, we should compare results against a baseline of 64 percent, which is the predicted guessability rate for an OBC middle-income voter based on the regression model presented in figure 4. Relative to this baseline, the observable implications of the information shortcuts mechanism show large effects with guessability rates dropping 6 percentage points when the voter comes from a swing group and increasing 4 percentage points when he comes from the most guessable top or bottom wealth quintiles. The effect on guessability of belonging to a GP President's partisan network—proxied by co-partisanship—is substantively large at 4 percent before exploring interactions. This increases, even for difficult to guess groups, when we take interactions between co-partisanship and elite and voter characteristics into account as displayed in figure 5. Guessability increases dramatically when interactions with co-ethnicity and contact with the panchayat samiti member are included.

8. Discussion

Overall, my findings suggest that village politicians—my proxy for local brokers—do not have the capacity to identify voters' partisan preferences outside of those who take the least effort or private information to identify. Even in competitive areas where the incentive to perform on guessability among local leaders who have some discretion over the allocation of selective state benefits should be palpable, there is little evidence that this is the case. Instead, guessability varies with group characteristics that

make voters broadly guessable; although, a simple decision rule based on polling data out-performed sarpanch considerably. This goes against the conventional wisdom of a range of theories in political science and against what researchers are often told by brokers themselves. It is also surprising given that sarpanch overwhelmingly personally know voters sampled in my voter survey and Kruks-Wisner's (2013) finding that sarpanch are the most frequent point of contact to the state. I argue that guessability captures a minimal requirement for clientelism as a party strategy rooted in the contingency of the exchange of votes for political support (Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; See also Kramon 2011). Low guessability has implications for whether or not parties pursue a strategy rooted in a quid pro quo exchange when it comes to the routine distribution of targeted state anti-poverty benefits and the distribution of cash and handouts during election campaigns. Low guessability is consistent with turnout buying (Nichter 2008); targeting to voters and activists integrated into partisan networks whose turnout is assured (Szwarcburg 2012; Dunning and Nilekani 2013); and non-discriminatory targeting (Kramon 2011). I present evidence that supports the partisan networks mechanism in the remaining chapters of the dissertation.[67] This is what we should expect in developing countries where there is competition among constituent groups for selective benefits (See Fearon 1999; Dunning and Nilekani 2013). If local politicians target benefits to voters who are integrated into local partisan networks, rather than assessing brokers by their ability to identify voters' partisan preferences, monitor their votes, and target benefits conditional on this information, party leaders plausibly assess brokers on their ability to organize voters into partisan networks.

The conclusion of this paper resonates with the broader literature on clientelism. To situate Rajasthan in the broader universe of cases in this literature, recall its macro-level characteristics discussed in section 4. Rajasthan provides a context in which the secret ballot is protected (and widely to believed to be so among the electorate). Second, Rajasthan has a stable party system rather than one in which major parties appear and disappear across each election (Lodha 2009). Guessability as a measure can be informative in less stable party systems; however, if the goal is to conduct a viable test of broker capacity, we should be able to assume that brokers can predict which parties will be top vote-winners in the next election cycle (See Lupu and Riedl 2013). Third, Rajasthan is a case of intense inter-party competition, which means that brokers cannot be certain that voter who depend on the state will have partisan preferences toward one party fused with state power (See Magaloni 2006; Medina and Stokes

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[67] I have the sense from anecdotal evidence that Kramon's argument is relevant to vote buying in India; however, my focus in the dissertation concerns strategies of the distribution of targeted state benefits.

2007). I treat these three contextual characteristics as scope conditions for the generalizability of my conclusions beyond Rajasthan: Where these conditions hold, we should expect variation in guessability to be explained by the availability of information shortcuts on group-party linkages and ties through partisan networks.

To extrapolate beyond Rajasthan, I consider macro-level variables that map onto three mechanisms discussed in this paper. At the outset, it is worth noting that existing literature is broadly consistent with a null finding for the perverse accountability mechanism. According to the perverse accountability mechanism, the contingent nature of clientelistic exchange is executed and monitored by brokers who function as political spies who constantly collect information on voters' political preferences and strategically target benefits according to this knowledge. According to Stokes, brokers should be able to monitor votes when they have made the costly investment in party machines. If it is the case that parties with the most extensive local machines have the capacity to identify voters' privately held partisan preferences, we should expect Argentina's Peronist Party (PJ) to have this capacity. The PJ is the canonical example of a machine party with extensive local reach that exceeds the level of organization of most if not all parties in Latin America (Levitsky 2003; Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Calvo and Murillo 2013). Although the PJ is the case from which Stokes' monitoring assumption is developed, the broader literature suggests that Peronists pursue strategies inconsistent with this. Nichter (2008) finds strong support for a strategy of targeting material benefits to induce turnout among supporters of the PJ; and a broad story of mobilizing voters into Peronist networks in which voters are expected to reveal their preferences predominates recent work (Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2013; Auyero 2001; Camp forthcoming).

Among cases that deviating from scope conditions, it appears that this assumption is more valid under hegemonic party regimes where a single party controls access to the state. For example, Magaloni (2006) argues that the PRI in Mexico was able to sustain its hegemony prior to democratization through a dense organization capable of identifying voters' preferences and credible threat to punish those who voted for the opposition. Similarly, Medina and Stokes (2007) argue that vote monitoring is plausible only where there is a political monopoly. Finally, Finan and Schechter (2012) find evidence that brokers have extensive information on voters' partisan and social preference. A basic assessment of this case, however, suggests that Paraguay speaks more to the pre-democratic PRI than the universe of competitive democracies with free and fair elections. Like Mexico under PRI rule, Paraguay was identified in 2008 as a semi-democracy with high party institutionalization (See Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2008).

Moreover, 19 percent of voters interviewed in the 2006 Latin Barometer Survey said that elections in that country were free and fair, compared to 69 percent who said they were not,[68] and Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2008) code its election commission is coded as highly politicized. Since guessability should follow a different dynamic where voters doubt the sanctity of the secret ballot than where this is not the case, guessability in Paraguay is likely to follow a different dynamic than countries that meet my scope conditions.

Instead, the most powerful predictors of guessability at the macro-level tap into the default observability and co-partisan networks mechanisms. The default observability mechanism posits that guessability will be higher when voters belong to ethnic or class groups that are clearly identified with a particular party. As a party system-level variable, we should expect guessability to be high in contexts where ethnic group are polarized across parties such as is the case in Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa (Posner 2005; Ferree 2003). Huber (2012) develops Group Voting Polarization, which is a country-level measure of the extent of vote polarization across groups, and takes the number and size of groups and parties into account. GVP increases when the party distance between any two groups increases, and approaches 1 when there are two equal sized groups that vote entirely for different parties. GVP provides a measure of party system ethnification, which captures the extent to which group information shortcut on party-voter linkages should be able to produce a high level of guessability irrespective of broker performance. We should expect guessability to be particularly high in highly ethnicized democracies such as Benin, Ghana, and South Africa (see also Wantchekon 2003; Ferree 2003).

Second, I expect variation in party organization to affect guessability with respect to the partisan networks mechanism. According to this mechanism, guessability should be higher with respect to voters from a broker's co-partisan network. Aggregating this up to a country as a whole, a party's ability to identify voters' partisan preferences increases as the share of the electorate organized collectively by its agents increases. Thus, guessability should be higher in countries where parties, through brokers, have a greater capacity to mobilize voters into partisan networks.[69] This depends on party organizational resources such as patronage, which motivate brokers to mobilize and voters to join these networks. It also requires an investment in cultivating a party machine of some form. Placing Rajasthan in

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[68] The coding as a semi-democracy is based on Freedom House ratings. Freedom House also gave Paraguay an electoral process score of 10 of 12.
[69] We should also expect guessability to vary across countries according to the level of economic development and across brokers' parties according to the socioeconomic status of party support bases and the capacity of parties to mobilize voters through networks (Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2013).

comparative perspective, Chhibber et al. (2013) code Rajasthan's two-party system as the most organized in North India and among the most organized in the country outside of left parties most active in two states. Although Rajasthan fits the general depiction of Indian parties as poorly locally organized, this tends to ignore the gram panchayat and the presence of alternative informal local actors. With respect to party organization, there is no reason to expect guessability to be lower in rural areas of Rajasthan than in rural parts of many other Indian states.[70] Moreover, the intermediate level of local party organization characteristic of India's more centralized and personalistic parties fits the characterization of parties in other regions of the developing world from Africa to the former USSR and Latin America. Controlling for Ethnic Voting Polarization, Rajasthan's low level of guessability should broadly apply to parties in these regions where parties often lack local organization as well as the financial resources needed to develop durable partisan networks.

9.   Conclusion

Theory in the clientelism literature suggests that brokers perform an essential information-gathering role that party leaders cannot perform. This makes local agents indispensible. Evidence presented here suggests that local brokers do not perform as well as theory expects or as well as inexpensive, low-information alternatives that rely on basic demographics or blunt polling data. The guessability results presented here have several important practical and theoretical implications. First, if brokers' central task is to collect information on voters' partisan preferences and votes—a plausibly more difficult task than the former—sarpanch fall short of this in rural Rajasthan. This begs the question of whether brokers fail at a task on which they are expected to perform or whether this is not the task party leaders expect them to perform after all? If it is the former, we should expect party leaders to pursue strategies that do not depend on guessability such as the allocation of benefits to aggregate units such as polling stations, targeting based on simple decision rules that do not depend on costly investment in brokers, or indiscriminate targeting. Recent evidence from Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2012), Argentina (Stokes et al. 2013; Calvo and Murillo 2013), Kenya (Kramon 2011), and Brazil (Zucco 2013) suggest that parties rely less and less on strategically targeted and monitored vote buying. Vincente (2008) similarly finds voters who accept handouts in election campaigns to be easy to persuade to vote as they wish. If guessability is low, the plausibility of vote monitoring may be too low for voters to perceive a credible threat for shirking at the polls. Kramon (2011) suggests that politicians respond to

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[70] I do not address this here, but a valuable contribution could be made to explore guessability in urban areas.

this environment by simply allocating cash and handouts indiscriminately to establish credibility as patrons to the poor as a signal to how they would govern if elected. Where guessability is low or simply not a priority due to the secret ballot and leaky bucket problem, we should expect parties to target benefits to constituents they know well or indiscriminately. This dissertation suggests that this implication holds for Rajasthan.

The broad conclusion of this paper is an optimistic one. Voters are more independent that scholarship on patronage politics suggests, which means that Indian voters are more empowered to hold their government accountable than expected. Party leaders cannot depend on the clientelistic quid pro quo to protect their political careers and frequent turnovers across Indian states attest to this point. The challenge Indian voters face is whether they use that power to not only register their disgust with the political class, but pressure them to deliver better governance. The challenge parties face is how to respond to rising demands for governance and selective benefits in an environment where accountability is not perverse.

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Appendix: Guessability Instrument and Tables

Figure 1: Elite Survey Instrument

1 DMH/011694881	2 DMH/011694881
नाम : महेन्द्र	नाम : भगवाना
पिता का नाम : हरिचन्द्र	पिता का नाम : बादरा
मकान संख्या : 54	मकान संख्या : 18
आयु : 28 लिंग : पुरूष	आयु : 50 लिंग : पुरूष

3 DMH/011694881	4 DMH/011694881
नाम : मनाराम	नाम : केशाराम
पिता का नाम : अचलाराम	पिता का नाम : राणाराम
मकान संख्या : 51	मकान संख्या : 19
आयु : 21 लिंग : पुरूष	आयु : 40 लिंग : पुरूष

5 DMH/011694881	6 DMH/011694881
नाम : जगदीश	नाम : मंगलाराम
पिता का नाम : हरचन्दराम	पिता का नाम : केसाराम
मकान संख्या : 25	मकान संख्या : 32
आयु : 25 लिंग : पुरूष	आयु : 30 लिंग : पुरूष

7 DMH/011694881	8 DMH/011694881
नाम : श्रवण कुमार	नाम : मकनाराम
पिता का नाम : जेठाराम	पिता का नाम : छोगाराम
मकान संख्या : 38	मकान संख्या : 41
आयु : 27 लिंग : पुरूष	आयु : 38 लिंग : पुरूष

9 DMH/011694881	10 DMH/011694881
नाम : निम्बाराम	नाम : मल्लाराम
पिता का नाम : रूग्गाराम	पिता का नाम : सकराराम
मकान संख्या : 45	मकान संख्या : 53
आयु : 50 लिंग : पुरूष	आयु : 30 लिंग : पुरूष

Now I will ask you about _____ **[VOTER'S NAME].**
[INTERVIEWER: POINT TO THE VOTER'S PHOTO.]

Write the voter list number of the first card you show the respondent.	Write:
If an MLA election were held tomorrow, which party do you think **[voter name]** _____ would support?	a) INC b) BJP c) Other _____
Which party do you think **[voter name]** _____ supported in the last MLA elections in 2008?	a) INC b) BJP c) Other _____

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics—Sarpanch

	Mean	SD
Male	0.54	0.5
Upper Castes	0.25	0.43
Other Backward Castes	0.37	0.48
Scheduled Castes	0.2	0.4
Scheduled Tribes	0.18	0.38
Illiterate	0.18	0.38
Primary School Education	0.24	0.43
Middle School Education	0.2	0.4
Secondary (inc. matriculation)	0.19	0.392
Post-Seconday	0.19	0.39
Land Holdings Scale	5.98	3.3
Political Ambitions	0.52	0.5
Active Party Members	0.39	0.49
Terms Served as GP President	0.14	0.47
Termed Served as GP Member	0.38	0.65
BJP Supporters	0.32	0.47
Congress Supporters	0.63	0.48
Participation in Canvassing	0.92	0.28
Relatives in politics	0.45	0.5

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics—Voters

	Mean	SD
Male	0.99	0.096
Upper Castes	0.095	0.293
Rajputs	0.113	0.316
Jats	0.096	0.295
Other Backward Castes	0.319	0.466
Scheduled Castes	0.48	0.355
Scheduled Tribes	0.063	0.244
Muslims	0.102	0.303
Land	3.1	2.64
Illiterate	0.36	0.48
Primary School Educated	0.24	0.43
Middle School Educated	0.22	0.42
Secondary School (Includes Matriculation)	0.35	0.53
Post-Secondary School	0.09	0.28
Voter Turnout in 2008 MLA Elections	0.91	0.29
Partisans	0.75	0.43
Swing Voters	0.17	0.37
Partisan Ties (homogeneity measure)	1.28	0.77
Volunteer in Political Campaigns	0.29	0.45
Share Attend Party Rallies	0.29	0.45
Relatives of Sarpanch	0.05	0.22
Friends of Sarpanch	0.15	0.36
Relative of Ward Member	0.12	0.33
Friend of Ward Member	0.17	0.37

Table 3: GP President Guessability Across Caste and Gender (%)[71]

Group	Male	Female	Overall
Forward Castes	75.5 (98)	72.5 (120)	73.9 (218)
Other Backward Castes	55.6 (153)	56.4 (133)	55.9 (286)
Scheduled Castes	71 (93)	61.6 (73)	69.3 (166)
Scheduled Tribes	75.3 (88)	64.6 (48)	61.8 (136)
Total (%)	(477)	(402)	(879)

Table 4: Sarpanch Polling Data Benchmark-Based and Observed Guessability[72]

	Margin	BJP	Congress	Others	Guessability (w/ Decision Rule)
Upper Castes	31.5%	172 (138)	0 (32)	0 (2)	80.2% (172)
Jats	6%	38 (48)	38 (26)	0 (2)	84.2% (76)
Gurjars	15%	23 (33)	23 (13)	0 (0)	78.2% (46)
Other OBCs	23%	210 (133)	0 (70)	0 (7)	63.3% (210)
Scheduled Castes	15.5%	0 (34)	129 (92)	0 (3)	71.3% (129)
STs	12%	49 (47)	49 (51)	0 (0)	98% (98)
Muslims	62%	0 (21)	75 (53)	0 (1)	70.7% (75)
Guessability Rate		**83.7 %(453)**	**68.9% (338)**	**0% (15)**	**75.9% (806)**

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[71] I provide the percent of correct guesses left of apprentices; the number of observations are in apprentices.

[72] Margin is the average difference in vote share between Congress and BJP across these subgroups according to Lokniti's 2008 Rajasthan State Assembly Post-Poll Survey. Numbers in apprentices are observed numbers of voters based on a vote intention item in the voter survey. Numbers left of the apprentice indicate the share of voters one would guess to support each party based on the decision rule benchmark that uses Lokniti polling data.

Table 5: Sarpanch Guessability (Vote Intention): Default Mechanism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Upper Castes	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Rajput	-0.09	-0.09	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Jat	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
OBC	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Meena	-0.21**	-0.21**	-0.23**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
ST	0.05	0.05	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Muslim	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wealth Quintile 1	0.15***	0.15***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Wealth Quintile 2	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth Quintile 4	0.04	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth Quintile 5	0.19***	0.18***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Participation		0.01	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Swing Voter			-0.19***
			(0.06)
Log Likelihood	-540.73	-543.14	-493.95
Num. obs.	806	806	739
Num. groups: gp number	92	92	92
Variance: gp number.(Intercept)	0.02	0.02	0.02
Variance: Residual	0.20	0.20	0.19

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 6: Sarpanch Guessability (2008 Vote) Default Mechanism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.67***	0.66***	0.68***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Upper Castes	-0.09	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Rajput	-0.10	-0.10	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Jat	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.27***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
OBC	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Meena	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.23***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
ST	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Muslim	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wealth Quintile 1	0.09*	0.09*	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth Quintile 2	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth Quintile 4	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth Quintile 5	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Participation		0.02	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Swing Voter			-0.14***
			(0.04)
Log Likelihood	-552.88	-555.18	-551.73
Num. obs.	831	831	831
Num. groups: gp number	92	92	92
Variance: gp number (Intercept)	0.02	0.02	0.02
Variance: Residual	0.20	0.20	0.19

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 7: Sarpanch Guessability (Vote Intention) Across Elite Characteristics

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	0.60***	0.64***	0.56***	0.59***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Tenure	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Family	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Active Member	0.05	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
MLA Contact	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.09*	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
PS Member Contact	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
ZP Member Contact	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Member * Participation		0.15**	0.13*	0.13*
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Member * Political Family		0.19*	0.17*	0.17*
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Co-ethnic			0.02	-0.04
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Co-partisan			0.16***	0.09*
			(0.04)	(0.05)
Co-partisan * Co-ethnic				0.21**
				(0.09)
Co-partisan * Jat				0.11
				(0.12)
Co-partisan * Meena				0.30*
				(0.16)
Co-partisan * MLA contact				-0.09
				(0.08)
Co-partisan PS Member Contact				0.16**
				(0.08)
Co-partisan * ZP Member Contact				0.00
				(0.09)
Log Likelihood	-506.24	-505.35	-500.59	-500.21
Num. obs.	739	739	739	737
Num. groups: gp number	92	92	92	92
Variance: gp number.(Intercept)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
Variance: Residual	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 8: Sarpanch Guessability (2008 Vote) Across Elite Characteristics

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	0.75***	0.79***	0.73***	0.74***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Education	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Tenure	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Family	-0.06	-0.14**	-0.14***	-0.13**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Active Member	0.09*	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
MLA Contact	-0.08*	-0.09**	-0.07*	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
PS Member Contact	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
ZP Member Contact	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Member * Participation		0.09	0.09	0.09
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Member * Political Family		0.20**	0.18**	0.16*
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Co-ethnic			0.06	0.03
			(0.04)	(0.05)
Co-partisan			0.11***	0.04
			(0.04)	(0.05)
Co-partisan * Co-ethnic				0.17*
				(0.09)
Co-partisan * Jat				0.19
				(0.11)
Co-partisan * Meena				0.45***
				(0.15)
Co-partisan * MLA contact				-0.13*
				(0.08)
Co-partisan * PS Member Contact				0.10
				(0.08)
Co-partisan * ZP Member Contact				0.03
				(0.08)
Log Likelihood	-563.18	-563.16	-562.78	-562.87
Num. obs.	831	831	831	828
Num. groups: gp number	92	92	92	92
Variance: gp number.(Intercept)	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Variance: Residual	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1